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There is mounting evidence that observers rely on statistical summaries of visual
information to maintain stable and coherent perception. Sensitivity to the mean (or
other prototypical value) of a visual feature (e.g., mean size) appears to be a pervasive
process in human visual perception. Previous studies in individuals diagnosed with
Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) have uncovered characteristic patterns of visual
processing that suggest they may rely more on enhanced local representations of
individual objects instead of computing such perceptual averages. To further explore
the fundamental nature of abstract statistical representation in visual perception, we
investigated perceptual averaging of mean size in a group of 12 high-functioning
individuals diagnosed with ASD using simplified versions of two identification and
adaptation tasks that elicited characteristic perceptual averaging effects in a control
group of neurotypical participants. In Experiment 1, participants performed with above
chance accuracy in recalling the mean size of a set of circles (mean task) despite
poor accuracy in recalling individual circle sizes (member task). In Experiment 2, their
judgments of single circle size were biased by mean size adaptation. Overall, these
results suggest that individuals with ASD perceptually average information about sets
of objects in the surrounding environment. Our results underscore the fundamental
nature of perceptual averaging in vision, and further our understanding of how autistic
individuals make sense of the external environment.
Keywords: perceptual averaging, ASD, mean size, perceptual adaptation, vision, attention
INTRODUCTION
The natural environment is typically complex and full of information, but our perceptual systems
have a limited capacity to represent only a fraction of this information in detail at any given
moment. One strategy that has been suggested to deal with this fundamental challenge is for
the brain to create meaningful statistical summaries of sets of objects from the mass of incoming
information in each glance without the need to explicitly encode individual items (for review, see
Ariely, 2001; Alvarez, 2011; Corbett and Melcher, 2014a,b). For example, we are able to quickly
represent the average size of trees in a forest but unable to represent the sizes of more than a few
individual trees in the same forest simultaneously.
This seemingly fundamental process of perceptual averaging is pervasive in visual perception
across task demands (e.g., Corbett et al., 2012; Oriet and Brand, 2013), focused attentional
constraints (e.g., Chong and Treisman, 2005), and spatial reference frames (Corbett and Melcher,
2014a), and does not rely on precise representations of individual objects (e.g., Parkes et al., 2001;
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Choo and Franconeri, 2010; Corbett and Oriet, 2011). Average
representations of size (Corbett et al., 2012), motion direction
(e.g., Anstis et al., 1998), orientation (e.g., Gibson and Radner,
1937), texture density (e.g., Durgin, 1995), and numerosity
(Burr and Ross, 2008) also undergo perceptual adaptation, a
process by which the extended presentation of a stimulus biases
the perception of subsequently presented stimuli in opposite
directions along fundamental dimensions of the adapting
stimulus. These findings converge to suggest that perceptual
averages are encoded as basic features of visual information
(Gibson, 1937; Campbell and Robson, 1968; Thompson and Burr,
2009). Furthermore, when the average properties of background
information remain stable over time, observers are better able
to find salient targets, suggesting that perceptually averaging
information allows the visual system to capitalize on the statistical
redundancy in the external environment to facilitate detailed
processing of salient information (Corbett and Melcher, 2014b).
Ensemble representations similarly affect how patients with focal
attentional deficits perceive individual objects (e.g., Demeyere
et al., 2008; Leib et al., 2012; Lanzoni et al., 2014; Pavlovskaya
et al., 2015). In fact, no study has yet reported an instance
where perceptual averaging can really be prevented, even when
participants are explicitly instructed to do so (e.g., Oriet and
Brand, 2013; see Dubé and Sekuler, 2015 for a recent review).
Here, we further explored the fundamental, compulsory nature of
statistical processing in a special population of highly functioning
autistic individuals with noted behavioral differences that have
been interpreted as suggesting that they may not incorporate
perceptual averages into their visual representations of the
external environment.
Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) is a developmental
disorder broadly categorized along a continuum of severity
by abnormalities in verbal and non-verbal communication,
including fixating or restricting behaviors and interests to
individual items and events, and deficits in adapting behavior
to match the needs of different contexts (American Psychiatric
Association [APA], 2013). ASD affects approximately 62 in
10,000 school-aged children worldwide (Elsabbagh et al., 2012).
Although autism research is heavily focused on symptoms of
social dysfunction, a number of studies have implicated sensory
and motor systems as either part of the explanation of the social
deficits or as parallel symptoms of ASD.
The visual system’s reliance on statistical regularities inherent
in the external environment to guide perception may provide
a powerful mechanism for coping with the potential sensory
overload imposed by the massive amount of incoming visual
information available in each glance (e.g., Corbett and Melcher,
2014b; Lanzoni et al., 2014), an ability that is thought to be a
particularly vulnerable in ASD. Yet, given numerous findings
suggesting an impaired ability in ASD to integrate individual
pieces of visual information into coherent wholes, it is possible
that these individuals do not perceptually average information.
Testing whether this otherwise pervasive averaging process is
manifest in ASD will further our understanding of how abstract
statistical representations sub-serve human visual perception.
Before describing the specific experiments we conducted to
examine perceptual averaging in autistic individuals, we briefly
review findings from relevant studies of ASD visual perception
and several theories proposed to account for these findings.
Visual Perception in ASD
Studies of visual perception in ASD typically use visual-spatial
or syntactic versus semantic tasks to assess local and global
processing abilities. There is convergent evidence from such
studies that autistic individuals show enhanced local processing
of features and fine detail. For example, individuals with ASD
exhibit superior performance compared to controls on tasks that
require speeded localization of individual objects embedded in
a visually similar global context (e.g., Embedded Figures task:
Shah and Frith, 1983; Happé, 1994; Jolliffe and Baron-Cohen,
1997, Visual search: Plaisted et al., 1998; O’Riordan et al., 2001), a
superior ability to segment complex objects into constituent parts
(Shah and Frith, 1993; Happé, 1994, 1999; Ehlers et al., 1997), and
a preference for processing local features and details over global
structure and form (e.g., Mottron et al., 1999).
The nature of global processing in autistic individuals is
less clear. Several previous studies have found evidence that
visual size contrast illusions persist in ASD using Ebbinghaus
stimuli (Figure 1), similar to displays in the present investigation
(e.g., Ropar and Mitchell, 1999, 2001; Hoy et al., 2004; c.f.,
Happé, 1996). Ebbinghaus and other low-level visual illusions are
thought to arise from fundamental characteristics of perception,
such that a lack of susceptibility is indicative of severe
abnormalities in low-level visual processing (e.g., Bruce et al.,
1996). Within this framework, ASD observers’ susceptibility to
size contrast illusions suggest that this aspect of fundamental
low-level perceptual processing remains intact.
Although results converge to suggest that at least some
low-level global information is integrated in ASD vision, it is
unclear whether ASD observers are able to rely on this type
of information in the same manner as neurotypical observers.
A number of studies of global visual perception in ASD
participants point to differences in their default spatial scale
of attention and associated deficits in broadening, shifting, or
dividing attention. For example, whereas global information
typically interferes with the processing of local information
(e.g., Navon, 1977), Plaisted et al. (1999) confirmed that autistic
observers also showed evidence of local interference on global
FIGURE 1 | Illustration of a typical Ebbinghaus display used in previous
studies of size contrast illusions in ASD observers. The central circles in
each set are physically identical in size, but perceived as an inverse function of
the sizes of the surrounding circles, such that the central circle surrounded by
the set of smaller circles (Left) appears larger than the central circle
surrounded by the larger set of circles (Right).
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letter identification in a Navon letter task when they had to divide
their attention between the local and global letters on each trial
(Mottron and Belleville, 1993), but not when they were instructed
to selectively attend to only the global or local letter on each
trial at the start of each block (Ozonoff et al., 1994, c.f., Rinehart
et al., 2000). These results suggest that autism is associated with
a deficit in spreading the focus of attention, or an “executive
dysfunction” in inhibiting further processing of local information
(e.g., Ozonoff et al., 1991; Hughes and Russell, 1993; Russell, 1997;
Hill, 2004, 2008). Such hypersensitivity to local detail has also
been used to explain previous findings that ASD observers fail
to detect impossible figures (e.g., Mottron and Belleville, 1993;
Mottron et al., 1999), and are slower and less accurate than
controls to determine which of two stimuli presented in temporal
succession is larger when the second stimulus is larger and they
have to broaden their focus from the first smaller stimulus to the
second larger stimulus (Mann and Walker, 2003).
There is also evidence that ASD involves an impaired ability to
rely on top-down knowledge about the prototypical appearance
of objects in the surrounding environment, such that autistic
perception is less reliant on prior and contextual knowledge. For
example, when Ropar and Mitchell (2002) presented autistic and
control observers with a circle projected from an illuminated
platform that tilted to produce an elliptical retinal image and
asked them to adjust the size of a stimulus presented on a separate
monitor to match the shape of the projected circle, both ASD and
control participants exaggerated the circularity of the adjusted
stimulus when it was surrounded by the context of two vertical
lines, but ASD observers’ adjustments showed significantly less
exaggeration than controls’ when the stimulus was presented in
isolation. These patterns of results suggest that both groups were
similarly affected by the vertical line cues to perspective, but ASD
observers did not rely on the prior knowledge that the projected
stimulus was actually a circle to the same extent as controls.
A similar failure to rely on prior information has been linked to
findings that ASD participants show reduced levels of perceptual
adaptation to facial identity (e.g., Pellicano et al., 2007) and
numerosity (Turi et al., 2015) compared to controls. A decreased
reliance on prior knowledge could also account for findings that
ASD observers fail to perceive impossible figures (e.g., Mottron
and Belleville, 1993; Mottron et al., 1999). Furthermore, ASD
observers have been reported not to show typical evidence of
Gestalt grouping by proximity or similarity thought to arise from
repeated exposure to canonical arrangements of objects in the
surrounding environment (Brosnan et al., 2004).
Numerous theories have evolved to explain such findings
regarding visual perception in autistic individuals. The Weak
Central Coherence theory (WCC; Frith, 1989) is based on the
idea that autistic individuals have increased focus on the smallest
possible details, and therefore experience fragmented perception
such that they cannot see past these details to construct a
global “big picture.” The Enhanced Perceptual Function theory
(EPF; Mottron and Burack, 2001) does not assume that global
processing is impaired, but that individuals with ASD retain
access to over-enhanced representations of low-level local and
featural information rather than relying more on global, “gist”
information over the course of information processing. More
recent theories have emerged linking visual deficits in ASD to
weaker influences of prior experience and related impairments
in predictive processing abilities that result in more fleeting,
veridical, and uncertain representations of the surrounding
environment [e.g., Bayesian “hypo-priors,” Pellicano and Burr
(2012); Predictive Impairment in Autism (PIA), Sinha et al.,
2014]. Although a fully representative and exhaustive list of
proposals that have been made to account for patterns of
differences in ASD visual perception is beyond the scope of
the current paper, we outlined this subset to provide support
for the idea that perceptual averaging in ASD remains an open
question, relevant to an active debate regarding theories of
sensory processing in autism.
In the context of the present investigation, theories like the
WCC that posit a deficit in constructing a coherent global
representation would predict that ASD individuals are less likely
to perceptually average information in sets of objects under any
circumstances. Similarly, Bayesian “hypo-prior” and PIA theories
predict that ASD observers are less likely to encode and/or
incorporate prior knowledge about the mean size of objects
into their psychophysical judgments of individual object size.
Theories like the EPF that propose ASD is associated with atypical
persistence of overly enhanced low-level local representations
predict that ASD observers are only likely to perceptually average
items when the task explicitly requires them to do so. In general,
all of the theories outlined above predict that ASD participants
would be more likely to encode and use the properties of specific
objects than they are to be biased by the global average.
Goal of the Present Study
In this initial investigation, we examined whether a group
of high-functioning ASD observers showed evidence of
perceptual averaging using simplified versions of two established
discrimination and adaptation tasks, effects that we also
replicated in a group of neurotypical observers. On the one
hand, finding evidence of perceptual averaging in this special
ASD population with noted visual and perceptual deficits
would provide compelling support for the fundamental nature of
perceptual averaging in human vision. On the other hand, finding
no evidence of perceptual averaging in ASD observers would
not rule out this possibility, but would support a foundation
from which to test whether impairments in this fundamental
process are linked to previously reported deficits in ASD visual
perception.
EXPERIMENT 1: MEAN VERSUS
MEMBER
In Experiment 1, we measured participants’ accuracy in
discriminating which of two test circles represented the mean size
of a previously shown set of different-sized circles (mean task)
and which of two test circles was a member of the previously
shown set of circles (member task). Ariely’s (2001) original
findings of superior representations of mean versus individual
member size provided initial evidence of the visual system’s
ability to represent the mean without needing to represent
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individual items. If autistic observers do not advantageously
represent mean size, then they should perform with near chance
accuracy in the mean task (e.g., Ariely, 2001; Corbett and
Oriet, 2011). It is also possible that autistic observers may over-
represent the local sizes of the individual circles in each set to
the extent that they actually exhibit above chance performance
in the member task. Alternatively, if ASD participants do
advantageously represent mean size, then they should perform
with superior accuracy in mean task.
Methods
Written informed consent was obtained from all participants
before beginning the experimental session, and the University of
Trento’s local ethics committee had approved the procedures.
ASD Participants
Participants in the ASD group were recruited and tested at the
Observation, Diagnosis, and Education Lab (ODFLab) at the
Department of Psychology and Cognitive Science, University of
Trento. The group was comprised of 12 young adults diagnosed
with autism with high cognitive functions according to DSM-IV
criteria by licensed clinical psychologists with extensive expertise
in ASD. Participants were between the ages of 17 and 26 (mean
age = 20.09 years, SD = 2.66 years, five females), all with normal
or corrected-to-normal vision and hearing, and no history of
other major psychiatric disorders or medical illness affecting
visual or cognitive functioning. Participants had IQ scores within
the normal range in the general population (mean IQ = 98.82,
SD = 13.81), as measured by available scores for 11 participants
on the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children-Revised (WISC-
R; Wechsler, 1974), the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children-
Third Edition (WISC-III; Wechsler, 1991), or the Wechsler
Adult Intelligence Scale-Revised (WAIS-R; Wechsler, 1981). The
IQ score for one participant previously diagnosed as high-
functioning was not available. The testing situation included
the presence of interns at the ODFLab (“experimenters”) who
were familiar to the participants from other testing and therapy
sessions. Both experimenters and participants were informed
only of the general purposes and procedures of the experiments,
and kept naïve to any specific hypotheses until data collection was
completed for all participants.
Control Participants
We also tested a group of 12 neurotypical young adults between
the ages of 19 and 26 (mean age = 22.33 years, SD = 2.42 years,
seven females) with normal or corrected-to-normal vision,
recruited from the student population of the University of
Trento. These participants were tested under similar conditions
as ASD participants, except that the ODFLab interns were not
present and the experiments were conducted in a testing room
in the psychophysical laboratories at the Center for Mind/Brain
Science (CIMeC) at the University of Trento.
Task
On each trial, after viewing a briefly presented display of 16 filled
circles, participants were presented with two test circles on the
left and right sides of the screen (Figure 2). In the mean task,
they were instructed to indicate which of the two test circles
corresponded to the mean size of the previous set. In the member
task, they indicated which circle was a member of the previous
set. If the circle on the left/right was the mean/member, then
they pressed the left/right arrow key on the computer keyboard.
They were informed that only one of the two test circles was
the mean/member, and to respond as quickly and accurately as
possible on each trial.
Apparatus
Participants were tested individually in a semi-darkened room,
seated in front of the center of the monitor, and restrained in
a chin rest. In both testing environments, a Dell PC presented
black circles against a gray (midway between black and white)
background on 19-inch monitor with a vertical refresh rate of
60 Hz (1024 pixel × 768 pixel resolution) viewed from a fixed
distance of 57 cm for all participants, such that 1◦ of visual angle
subtended approximately 29 pixels. Responses were recorded
using the computer keyboard. Matlab R© software (version 2009a)
in conjunction with the Psychophysics Toolbox (Brainard, 1997;
Pelli, 1997) controlled all the display, timing, and response
functions.
Stimuli
One of the three groups of seven small, medium, or large circle
sizes illustrated in Figure 2 was used to construct the set and
test displays on each trial in Experiment 1. These three different
groups of sizes were used to prevent any effects of participants
becoming overly familiar with a single group of sizes over the
course of the experiment and perhaps basing their judgments on
previously seen stimuli.
On each trial of Experiment 1, participants were presented
with a display of 16 circles (Figure 2). The display of 16 circles
was composed of four repetitions of the four different sizes in
one of the three small, medium, or large groups of seven circles.
These four sizes within each group were always circle #s 1, 3, 5,
and 7, indicated in dashed rectangles in Figure 2 (circle #s 2, 4,
and 6 were never present in the set, and circle #4 represented the
mean of each corresponding set). The positions of the 16 circles in
each set were randomized on every trial. Each set of 16 circles was
composed of two concentric rings, an inner ring of eight circles
subtending 5◦ of visual angle, and an outer ring of eight circles
subtending 9◦ of visual angle. Within each of the two rings, the
eight circles were initially positioned at one of eight cardinal or
45◦ inter-cardinal locations, then jittered independently in the x-
and y-directions by a random factor between −0.5◦ and +0.5◦
of visual angle on each trial. The positions of all 16 circles were
restricted such that no individual circle was within 0.125◦ of any
other circle in either the x- or y-direction.
The test displays consisted of two single circles presented at
2◦ eccentricity to the left and right of the horizontal meridian
(Figure 2). In the mean task, one of these circles (left or right,
determined randomly on each trial) corresponded to the mean
size of the set (#4), which was never actually present in the set.
The circle on the opposite side was one of the six other sizes in
the group, regardless of whether it was present or not in the set,
resulting in six possible test pairings. In the member task, one of
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FIGURE 2 | Small, medium, and large circle sets used in Experiment 1 (top left). Participants decided which of two test circles represented the mean (top
right) or a member (bottom right) of a previously displayed set of circles (middle) composed of four repetitions of four circle sizes from one of three groups of seven
circle sizes (top left). Circle sizes included in the set displays are surrounded by gray dashed rectangles and circles used in test displays are listed for each task.
the test circles was always a member present in the set (#s 1, 3,
5, or 7), and the opposite circle was never present in the set (#s
2, 4, or 6), resulting in 12 possible pairings of present/absent test
circles.
Procedure
Each trial began with a 0.5◦ white fixation cross in the center of
an otherwise blank gray screen. Participants were instructed to
fixate the cross and press the spacebar to begin the trial. As soon
as the spacebar was pressed, the fixation turned black, signaling
that the trial was beginning. Participants remained fixating on
the cross for 500 ms. Next, the set of 16 black circles was shown
on the gray background (without the fixation cross) for 1000 ms.
Immediately after the offset of the set of circles, two test circles
were presented on a gray screen for 500 ms, followed by a blank
gray screen except for a red fixation cross, signaling observers to
make their response to the mean or member task.
The mean and member tasks were performed in separate
blocks of trials. Each observer performed two blocks of each task
for a total of four blocks of trials in Experiment 1. The order of
the four blocks was counterbalanced over participants. In each
task (mean or member), each block contained 36 trials and lasted
less than 5 min. Each block of the mean task contained two trials
with each of the 6 test pairings × 3 size groups, presented in
pseudorandom order, for a total of 72 trials per point in the
mean task. Each block of the member task contained one trial
with each of the 12 test pairings × 3 size groups, presented in
pseudorandom order, also for a total of 72 trials per point.
Before beginning the first block of each task, participants
were given one block of 10 practice trials and written illustrated
instructions, which were also re-presented at the start of every
experimental block. The experimenter ensured all participants’
questions had been answered and they fully understood the task
before advancing to the experimental blocks. All participants
were informed of the length of each block, as well as the length
of the entire experiment. They were also strongly encouraged not
to move their heads or bodies for the entire duration of each
experimental block.
Discrimination Task
To ensure that all participants could reliably discriminate
between adjacent sizes of the seven different circles in each of
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the three sets of circles used in the experimental displays, they
each completed one block of 18 trials in a discrimination task
before beginning Experiment 1, comparing each adjacent-size
circle pair (1 vs. 2, 2 vs. 3, 3 vs. 4, etc. . .) two times, with circle
pairs presented in random order. On each trial, the circle pair was
presented in the center of the screen for 500 ms, as outlined above
for the test displays in the main Experiment 1, and participants
had to judge which circle (left or right) was larger using the arrow
keys. All subjects performed with 100% accuracy, indicating that
they were all able to discriminate between each of the sizes tested
in Experiment 1.
On all trials in the discrimination block and all experimental
blocks in Experiments 1 and 2, the experimenter could press the
‘r’ key on the keyboard if the participant was not looking at the
screen during the set or test displays, and the trial was stopped
and redone at the end of the block. Only one trial was redone,
for one ASD participant, because someone knocked on the door
during testing.
Experiments 1 (including the discrimination block) and
2 were conducted during the same session with the same
participants, experimenters, and apparatuses. The order of
Experiments 1 and 2 was counterbalanced over participants in
each ASD and control group. Participants always completed the
discrimination block immediately prior to beginning Experiment
1. The total length of an entire experimental session was less than
45 min.
Results
For both experiments in the present investigation, we compared
performance within ASD and control groups separately. The data
were analyzed in this manner to demonstrate evidence for the
presence or absence of perceptual averaging in ASD, which is
the main focus of the present investigation. Importantly, we used
streamlined versions of Ariely’s (2001) original mean/member
tasks (Experiment 1)1 and Corbett et al.’s (2012) adaptation
task (Experiment 2)2 to obtain basic measures of perceptual
averaging within the practical limitations imposed when testing
ASD participants. We include data from the group of control
participants in each experiment only to verify that our simplified
tasks elicited the same type of perceptual effects previously
reported for neurotypical observers. An investigation of any small
differences in perceptual averaging between ASD and control
groups would require a large sample size. Instead, we focused
on a relatively homogenous group of high-functioning ASD
participants who were willing and able to perform the tasks.
1Ariely (2001) originally used different set sizes of 4, 8, 12, and 16 circles and
a broad range of test circle sizes to measure member identification and mean
discrimination in separate experiments. Member identification was measured in
both a yes/no paradigm with a single test stimulus which participants judged as
either matching or not matching one of the items in a previously presented set of
circles, and a two-alternative forced choice (2-AFC) paradigm where participants
had to select which of two test stimuli matched a member of the previously shown
set. Mean discrimination performance was measured with a single test circle which
participants judged as larger or smaller than the mean size of the set of previously
shown circles.
2In Corbett et al.’s (2012), we used the method of constant stimuli to measure the
difference in the physical size between two test circles necessary to perceive them
as the same size when observers were adapted to a large mean size patch of circles
on one half of the display and a small means size patch on the opposite side.
We analyzed the main effect of Task (mean or member)
separately for ASD and control participant groups. To facilitate
visual comparisons, results in the mean and member tasks
are shown for both groups in Figure 3, and for individual
participants in Table 1.
ASD Participants
A within-subjects, repeated-measures ANOVA revealed a main
effect of Task (Mean/Member) on accuracy [Figure 3A;
F(1,11) = 13.091, MSE = 0.003, p = 0.004, η2 = 0.543]. Further
one-sample t-tests confirmed that accuracy in the mean task
(M = 0.604, SD = 0.071) was significantly different from chance
[50% chance accuracy = 0.5 proportion correct; t(11) = 5.108,
SEM = 0.02, p < 0.001, d = 0.426], but accuracy in the member
task (M= 0.528, SD= 0.071) was not [t(11)= 1.344, SEM= 0.02,
p= 0.206, d= 0.112]. To ensure that this accuracy difference was
not due to a trade-off with reaction time (RT), we performed an
ANOVA on RT between the two tasks, which was not significant
(mean task: M = 739.53 ms, SD = 626.05 ms; member task:
M = 849.87 ms, SD= 526.89 ms; p= 0.385).
Control Participants
A within-subjects, repeated-measures ANOVA also revealed a
main effect of Task on control participants’ accuracy [Figure 3B;
F(1,11) = 21.214, MSE = 0.006, p = 0.001, η2 = 0.659]. One
sample t-tests also showed that accuracy in the mean task
(M = 0.653, SD = 0.088) was significantly different from chance
[t(11) = 5.984, SEM = 0.026, p < 0.001, d = 0.499], but
accuracy in the member task (M = 0.503, SD = 0.069) was not
[t(11) = 0.168, SEM = 0.02, p = 0.87, d = 0.014]. A follow-up
ANOVA also showed no evidence of a significant difference in
RT between tasks (mean task: M = 608.80 ms, SD = 437.35 ms;
member task: M = 586.39 ms, SD= 413.47 ms; p= 0.623).
Overestimation of Mean Size
Previous studies of neurotypical observers have reported
evidence of systematic overestimation of mean size (e.g., Chong
and Treisman, 2003; Bauer, 2009; Corbett and Oriet, 2011;
Corbett et al., 2012; Corbett and Melcher, 2014a; Corbett and
Song, 2014). Given that ASD observers’ superior accuracy in the
mean task demonstrates they indeed represent mean size, we next
examined whether they also show evidence of an overestimation
bias, such that they are more accurate in discriminating which
of the two test circles was the mean size when the opposite test
was smaller versus larger than the mean size test circle. This
is a particularly interesting question given converging evidence
suggesting that autistic individuals retain access to superior
representations of features and fine details (Shah and Frith, 1983,
1993; Happé, 1994, 1999; Ehlers et al., 1997; Jolliffe and Baron-
Cohen, 1997; Plaisted et al., 1998; O’Riordan et al., 2001). Along
these lines, autistic participants might also retain a more precise
representation of mean size, such that they are not susceptible to
this bias characterized by asymmetric accuracy as a function of
the difference in size between the mean and opposite test circle.
To explore this possibility, we separately examined ASD and
control observers’ accuracy in the mean task as a function of
the difference in the relative step size between the mean size test
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FIGURE 3 | Experiment 1 Results: Accuracy in the mean task was significantly greater than in the member task for both groups of ASD (A) and
control (B) participants. Error bars represent 95% within-subjects confidence intervals (Loftus and Masson, 1994) Asterisks represent significant main effects with
p = 0.004 in the ASD group and p = 0.001 in the Control group. Dashed horizontal line represents 50% chance performance.
TABLE 1 | Experiment 1 Individual Performance: Average proportion
correct accuracy in the mean and member tasks for each of the 12
participants in the ASD (left) and control (right) groups, as well as
grand-average accuracy (bold) and standard deviation (italic) for each
task in each group.
ASD (n = 12) Control (n = 12)
Mean Member Mean Member
0.61 0.5 0.53 0.61
0.56 0.5 0.78 0.44
0.78 0.58 0.56 0.44
0.58 0.5 0.58 0.44
0.53 0.58 0.67 0.5
0.58 0.47 0.58 0.44
0.64 0.56 0.58 0.53
0.5 0.42 0.64 0.56
0.64 0.69 0.75 0.64
0.61 0.56 0.72 0.5
0.58 0.5 0.78 0.47
0.64 0.47 0.67 0.47
Average 0.6 0.52 0.65 0.5
SD 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.07
circle and the opposite test circle on each trial (i.e., the opposite
test circle could be −3, −2, −1, 1, 2, or 3 steps from the mean
test circle)3. We performed a within-subjects, repeated-measures
ANOVA on accuracy between the six possible mean/opposite test
circle pairings for each group. As expected, there was a main effect
of the relative difference in opposite and mean test circle size
[F(5,11)= 3.6, MSE= 0.046, p= 0.007, η2 = 0.247] accompanied
by a significant linear trend [F(1,11) = 7.022, MSE = 0.066,
p = 0.023, η2 = 0.39] on control participants’ accuracy. Taken
with the positive skew illustrated in Figure 4B, these results
3Note that it was not possible to make similar comparisons about the accuracy
of judgments in the member task of Experiment 1, in which one test circle was
a member of the set and the opposite test circle was not a member of the set.
Although the non-member test circle could be the mean or a non-mean size that
was not present, and also could be several different step sizes from the member
test circle, the non-member test circle could also be various step sizes from other
members of the set that were not represented by the member.
suggest control participants were more accurate in discriminating
which of the two test circles was the mean size when the opposite
test was smaller than the mean versus when it was the same
absolute difference in size but larger than the mean. However,
there was neither evidence of a main effect [F(5,11) = 0.373,
MSE = 0.111, p = 0.865, η2 = 0.033], nor of a linear trend
[F(1,11) < 0.001, MSE = 0.366, p = 0.993, η2 < 0.001] of the
relative difference in test circle size on ASD participants’ accuracy.
There was also no corresponding positive skew apparent in
Figure 4A.
Discussion
Overall, participants were more accurate when deciding which
of two test circles represented the mean size of the set of circles
than they were at deciding which test circle was a member
of the set shown on each trial. Furthermore, participants were
better than chance in the mean judgment, but there was no
evidence that they performed better than chance in the member
task. Importantly, perfect accuracy in the initial discrimination
task shows that all participants were able to perceive the
difference in sizes of all adjacent circles used in the mean and
member tasks of Experiment 1. Finally, the significant effect
of the mean/member task in the control group confirmed that
our simplified version of previously used perceptual averaging
paradigms (e.g., Ariely, 2001; Corbett and Oriet, 2011) elicits
expected effects in neurotypical observers. Taken together, these
results suggest that autistic participants were able to represent the
mean size of the set of circles even though they could not recall
whether a given individual circle size was present in the set. These
findings are in-line with previous findings of superior mean
versus member performance in the more general population
(Ariely, 2001; Corbett and Oriet, 2011).
Interestingly, ASD participants did not show the same pattern
of mean size overestimation in the mean task observed here for
controls and in several previous reports (Chong and Treisman,
2003; Bauer, 2009; Corbett and Oriet, 2011; Corbett et al., 2012;
Corbett and Melcher, 2014a; Corbett and Song, 2014). We note
that because we used two test circles in the mean task, it is possible
that the pattern of results in control participants reflected an
underestimation of individual size instead of an overestimation
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FIGURE 4 | Experiment 1 Mean Size Overestimation: Autistic participants (A) did not manifest the same positively skewed pattern of accuracy as
controls (B) as a function of the relative difference in size between the opposite and mean test circles. Error bars represent 95% within-subjects
confidence intervals (Loftus and Masson, 1994). The asterisk beside control performance represents a significant main effect with p = 0.007 in a 1-way ANOVA
comparing accuracy over relative step sizes. Dashed horizontal line represents 50% chance performance.
of mean size. However, in light of similar findings of mean
size overestimation in neurotypical observers using a single test
stimulus and the method of adjustment (Chong and Treisman,
2003; Bauer, 2009), it is more likely the present pattern of
asymmetry in control observers’ accuracy as a function of the
difference in size between the mean and opposite test circle
reflects this typical overestimation of mean size. Although the
null main effect of the difference in relative test circle size, and
lack of a significant linear trend in ASD participants’ accuracy
cannot directly be taken as evidence of a lack of overestimation
bias in ASD observers, or that these observers are more accurate
(show less overestimation of mean size) than controls, these
findings do raise interesting and important questions about the
precision of perceptual averaging in ASD and other special
populations. Of greatest interest in the context present study,
given previous findings that individuals with ASD are better at
representing features and fine detail (Shah and Frith, 1983, 1993;
Happé, 1994, 1999; Ehlers et al., 1997; Jolliffe and Baron-Cohen,
1997; Plaisted et al., 1998; O’Riordan et al., 2001), they may also
retain a more precise representation of mean size such that they
are less susceptible to this overestimation bias.
E2: ADAPTATION TO MEAN SIZE
In Experiment 2, we tested whether participants showed evidence
of perceptual adaptation to mean size. We used a simplified
version of the paradigm originally used by Corbett et al. (2012)
to demonstrate that neurotypical observers perceive individual
test circle sizes as an inverse function of the average size of
objects in preceding adaptor sets (a negative aftereffect of mean
size adaptation). Participants adapted to two sets of test circles
with different mean sizes, and then determined which of the two
subsequently presented test circles was larger. Unbeknownst to
participants, the two test circles were the same physical size on
the majority of trials (only a handful of catch trials were present
in each experimental block to ensure that participants did not
become aware of this or frustrated by the lack of any perceived
difference in any trial).
A negative aftereffect of mean size adaptation in ASD
participants in Experiment 2 would offer further support for
the proposal that mean size is encoded along a single visual
dimension as a basic attribute (Corbett and Oriet, 2011; Corbett
et al., 2012; Corbett and Melcher, 2014a; Corbett and Song, 2014).
On the contrary, theories that propose individuals with autism
do not construct global representations due to hypersensitivity
to local detail (e.g., WCC: Frith, 1989), theories that propose
autistics are better able to suppress the influence of global
properties (e.g., EPF: Mottron and Burack, 2001) and only
represent global properties when explicitly instructed to do so
(Mottron et al., 1999; Plaisted et al., 1999; Rinehart et al., 2000),
and theories that propose impairments in ASD are linked to
deficits in encoding or incorporating prior information (e.g.,
Pellicano and Burr, 2012; Sinha et al., 2014) all suggest that ASD
observers may not show evidence of such perceptual averaging
adaptation aftereffects.
Methods
The same groups of ASD and control observers performed
Experiment 2 under the same experimental conditions as in
Experiment 1.
Task
After adapting to two patches of heterogeneously sized circles
on the either side of the screen, participants were presented
with two single test circles and asked to judge which circle was
larger (left or right) using the corresponding arrows on the
computer keyboard. They were instructed to respond as quickly
and accurately as possible and to guess if they were unsure.
Stimuli
Adapting displays consisted of two sets of 14 circles (Figure 5).
Each set was composed of two concentric rings, an inner ring of
six circles subtending 2.5◦ of visual angle, and an outer ring of
eight circles subtending 4.5◦ of visual angle. Circles in each set
were positioned and jittered on each trial in the same manner as
in Experiment 1.
The 14 circles in the smaller adapting set ranged in diameter
from 0.5◦ to 1.15◦ in 0.05◦ steps, with a mean size of 0.825◦ of
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 8 November 2016 | Volume 7 | Article 1735
fpsyg-07-01735 November 3, 2016 Time: 17:28 # 9
Corbett et al. Autism and Perceptual Averaging
FIGURE 5 | Schematic illustration of the adaptation paradigm used in Experiment 2. Each block began with an initial adaptation display of two side-by-side
patches of big and small heterogeneously sized circles presented for 1 min. For the remainder of each block, trials cycled between a 2-s display of the circle patches
to “top-up” adaptation on each trial, followed by a 500-ms test display of two single circles, then a red fixation prompt until response. Observers fixated the central
cross during the entire block of trials, and their task was to determine which test circle (the left or right) was larger on every trial.
visual angle, and the 14 circles in the larger adapting set ranged
in diameter from 0.85◦ to 1.5◦, also in 0.05◦ steps, with a mean
size of 1.175◦ of visual angle. Importantly, half of the circles
in each set had the same seven diameters. We randomized the
positions of the 14 individual circles in each adapting set on
each trial to ensure that no location in either patch repeatedly
contained a circle that was larger or smaller than any other
circle in the set. Therefore, mean size (diameter) was the only
constant difference between the two sets over the course of the
experiment.
As in Experiment 1, the test displays consisted of two single
circles, one on each side of the display. Unknown to subjects, in
the majority of trials in each block (20), the two test circles were
identical physical sizes (1◦ of visual angle). On the remaining
five catch trials, one test circle (randomly selected as left or
right) was either 0.8◦ or 1.2◦, and appeared obviously smaller
or larger than the opposite 1◦ test circle. We randomized the
positions of the test circles within the two adapted regions from
trial-to-trial, so that no given location in either adapted region
was consistently probed, making it more likely that the mean
size of the entire display of adapting circles was responsible for
any observed effects on perceived size (e.g., Chong et al., 2008;
Corbett and Oriet, 2011; Corbett et al., 2012).
As illustrated in Figure 5, each two-ringed adapting circle set
was 8◦ of eccentricity from the center of the monitor, relative
to the horizontal meridian. One test circle was presented in the
center of each adapted region, with the x- and y-positions of each
test circle jittered independently on each trial by a random factor
between 0.5◦ and 1◦ of visual angle.
Procedure
Each participant performed a practice block of 15 trials, followed
by two experimental blocks of 30 trials; one block with the
larger mean size adapting set on the left side of the screen
(Big on Left; BoL), and one block with the larger mean size
on the right (Big on Right; BoR). Each block lasted less than
5 min. Within each block, the two test circles were physically
equal in size on all but five (catch) trials. This resulted
in 25 trials in each BoL and BoR Adapting condition for
each participant. The order of Adapting conditions (BoL/BoR)
was counterbalanced over observers. Practice blocks were also
randomized over participants, such that there was no systematic
relation between the big adapting side in the practice block and
the order of the experimental (BoL/BoR) blocks. Participants
were told that sometimes the two test circles might look equally
sized, and to make their best guess if they were not sure
which was larger. No other information was provided about
the relative locations or sizes of the adapting displays. All
participants received written illustrated instructions displayed
on the experimental monitor, which were also re-presented at
the start of every experimental block. The experimenter ensured
that all participants’ questions had been answered and they
fully understood the task before advancing to experimental
blocks.
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As shown in Figure 5, each block began with an initial
adaptation phase, during which time participants fixated the
central cross while viewing a display of the two side-
by-side adapting patches for 1 minute. After this initial
adaptation period, trials in each block cycled between a “top-
up” adapting display presented for 2 s, to ensure adaptation
was maintained throughout each block of trials, followed by
a test display consisting of the two single circles and the
fixation cross for 500 ms and, finally, a red fixation cross on
an otherwise blank screen signaling participants to respond
which of the two test circles was larger. The red fixation
remained on the screen until participants responded, then
the next trial’s top-up adaptation display was presented and
the cycle repeated until the end of the block. Participants
were instructed to remain fixated during the entire course
of each experimental block, and the experimenter sat nearby
and continuously watched them as they performed each trial
to ensure they did not make any noticeable eye or head
movements.
Results
For each participant in each BoL/BoR Adapting condition,
we computed the average proportion of responses that the
test circle on the right was larger (Table 2). All participants
correctly chose the larger test circle in all catch trials, and these
trials were excluded from further analysis. Two within-subjects,
repeated-measures ANOVAs on the proportions of “right test
is larger” responses in each Adapting condition (BoL/BoR)
confirmed that both ASD [Figure 6A; F(1,11) = 16.432,
MSE = 0.014, p = 0.002, η2 = 0.599] and control participants
[Figure 6B; F(1,11) = 17.648, MSE = 0.015, p = 0.001,
η2 = 0.616] experienced a significant negative adaptation
aftereffect.
Discussion
The results of Experiment 2 demonstrated that ASD participants’
perceptions of the sizes of individual test circles were biased by
adaptation to mean size. This suggests that observers implicitly
encoded the mean sizes of the sets of circles, even though this
information was task irrelevant. In addition, the significant effect
of Adapting condition in the control group confirms that our
simplified version of Corbett et al.’s (2012) task is sensitive
to mean size adaptation aftereffects previously demonstrated
for neurotypical observers. Importantly, observers were never
explicitly instructed to represent the mean size of the adapting
patches, and accuracy in judging the sizes of the individual test
circles was emphasized. This negative aftereffect of adaptation
to mean size in ASD observers provides further support that
mean size is encoded as a fundamental perceptual attribute,
and is not predicted by previous proposals that individuals
with autism do not construct global representations due to
hypersensitivity to local detail (e.g., WCC: Frith, 1989), are
not susceptible to size-contrast illusions (e.g., Happé, 1996), are
better able to suppress the influence of global properties (e.g.,
EPF: Mottron and Burack, 2001), represent global properties
only when explicitly instructed to do so (Mottron et al.,
1999; Plaisted et al., 1999; Rinehart et al., 2000), or do
TABLE 2 | Experiment 2 Individual Performance: Average proportion of
“Right test circle is larger” responses in the BoL and BoR adapting
conditions for each of the 12 participants in the ASD (left) and Control
(right) groups, as well as grand-average accuracy (bold) and standard
deviation (italic) for each condition in each group.
ASD (n = 12) Control (n = 12)
BoL BoR BoL BoR
0.52 0.48 0.84 0.72
0.36 0.28 0.68 0.32
0.72 0.28 0.44 0.24
0.8 0.8 0.68 0.68
0.52 0.44 0.68 0.52
0.56 0.4 0.68 0.56
0.84 0.36 0.56 0.16
0.64 0.44 0.48 0.08
0.48 0.24 0.68 0.52
0.64 0.64 0.4 0.48
0.48 0.12 0.92 0.44
1 0.76 0.44 0.28
Average 0.63 0.44 0.62 0.47
SD 0.18 0.21 0.16 0.2
not encode and/or incorporate prior knowledge about the
mean size of objects into their psychophysical judgments of
individual object size (e.g., Pellicano and Burr, 2012; Sinha et al.,
2014).
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Two experiments examined whether the averaging process that
has so far been found to be pervasive in visual perception is
manifest in a special ASD population with noted behavioral
differences that have been interpreted as suggesting that
they may not incorporate such perceptual averages into their
visual representations of the external environment. Across
both experiments, both ASD and control participants showed
behavioral effects of perceptual averaging, specifically the
encoding of mean size. Most importantly, ASD participants
performed with superior accuracy in the mean versus member
task, indexing a perceptual advantage for mean versus individual
representations (Experiment 1), and they were also susceptible
to mean size adaptation (Experiment 2), providing further
evidence for the fundamental and pervasive nature of statistical
representations in visual perception (e.g., Ariely, 2001; Chong
and Treisman, 2003, 2005; Corbett and Oriet, 2011; Corbett
et al., 2012; Corbett and Melcher, 2014a; Dubé and Sekuler,
2015).
Notably, the significant effects of perceptual averaging
observed for both groups were also reflected in individual
performance. In Experiment 1, accuracy was higher in the
mean versus member task for all but two ASD participants
and one control participant (Table 1), and the effects of mean
size adaptation on individuals’ size judgments in Experiment 2
are apparent for all but two other ASD participants and one
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FIGURE 6 | Experiment 2 Results: ASD (A) and control (B) participants experienced a negative aftereffect of adaptation to mean size, such that they
judged the right circle in a pair of two physically identical test circles as being larger significantly more often when they adapted to the big mean
size patch of test circles on the left (and the small mean size patch on the right) than when they were adapted to the big mean size patch on the right
(and the small mean size patch on the left). Error bars represent 95% within-subjects confidence intervals (Loftus and Masson, 1994) Asterisks represent
significant main effects with p = 0.002 in the ASD group and p = 0.001 in the Control group. Dashed horizontal line represents 50% chance performance.
other control participant who showed no difference between BoL
and BoR adapting conditions, and one other control subject
who showed an opposite response pattern between adapting
conditions (Table 2). Therefore, our results confirm that these
simplified versions of mean/member (Ariely, 2001; Corbett and
Oriet, 2011) and mean size adaptation (Corbett et al., 2012)
paradigms elicit perceptual averaging effects in both the ASD and
control groups.
Although the present results support numerous proposals
from previous studies of perceptual averaging, several of our
findings do not align well with proposals from the literature
regarding visual perception in ASD. For example, our findings
that ASD observers represented mean size regardless of whether
it was explicitly task relevant (Experiment 1, mean task) or
irrelevant and even detrimental to the task (Experiment 2)
provide strong support for claims that statistical summary
representation is a fundamental, automatic, and unavoidable
process (e.g., Ariely, 2001; Chong and Treisman, 2003, 2005;
Corbett and Oriet, 2011; Corbett et al., 2012; Oriet and Brand,
2013; Corbett and Melcher, 2014a; Dubé and Sekuler, 2015). Yet
these pervasive effects of mean size in ASD vision are difficult
to reconcile with proposals that autistics will only represent
global properties when explicitly instructed to do so (Mottron
et al., 1999; Plaisted et al., 1999; Rinehart et al., 2000; Mottron
and Burack, 2001), or when attention is directed globally versus
locally (e.g., Plaisted et al., 1999). The persistent perceptual
influences of mean size found here do fit well with previous
proposals that even though items are not represented without
focused local attention, mean size is represented both when
attention is spread globally across an array of items and when
it is focused locally to discriminate characteristics of individual
items (e.g., Chong and Treisman, 2005). Along these lines,
future studies of perceptual averaging in ASD could help to
clarify whether autism is associated with deficits in spreading
the focus of attention, and/or an “executive dysfunction” in
inhibiting further processing of local information (e.g., Ozonoff
et al., 1991; Hughes and Russell, 1993; Russell, 1997; Hill, 2004,
2008).
The present results demonstrating susceptibility to mean size
adaptation also fit with previous findings that ASD observers
are sensitive to size contrast illusions (e.g., Ropar and Mitchell,
1999, 2001; Hoy et al., 2004; c.f., Happé, 1996), providing
converging evidence that this type of low level perceptual
processing remains intact in ASD. It is also possible that the sizes
of the individual test circles in Experiment 2 were processed as
a function of top-down knowledge of depth cues (e.g., Ropar
and Mitchell, 2002; Brosnan et al., 2004), such that stimuli
presented to the region adapted to the smaller mean size patch
were seen as larger because they were perceived to be farther
away. Yet, such top-down influences cannot account for the
findings of superior mean versus member performance in both
groups of observers in Experiment 1. Along these lines, our
results also have important implications for theories that posit
impairments in predicting or integrating prior information in
ASD (e.g., Pellicano and Burr, 2012; Sinha et al., 2014). For
example, previous studies have reported that observers with ASD
are less susceptible to adaptation to facial identity (Pellicano
et al., 2007) and numerosity (Turi et al., 2015). However,
the present results demonstrating susceptibility to mean size
adaptation strongly suggest that ASD observers nonetheless
rely on statistical redundancies in the external environment
to some extent. As biases to represent central tendencies in
visual information are advantageous for reducing variability
and improving the reliability of perception, future studies of
perceptual averaging in ASD have great potential to inform the
development of techniques for reducing and coping with sensory
uncertainty.
Although our findings converge to support the hypothesized
fundamental nature of perceptual averaging in vision, there
are several important considerations in interpreting the present
results. As we have noted, our sample size was limited to
a fairly homogenous group of 12 individuals diagnosed with
highly functioning ASD, limiting us from drawing broader
statistical comparisons between the two groups of ASD and
control participants. In addition, we did not measure IQ in
control observers under the assumption that these students
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from the University of Trento represented a sample of the
general population with IQ scores roughly normally distributed
in the same manner as the IQs of highly functioning ASD
participants. However, it is possible that differences in IQ are
also involved in the present findings. For example, it is possible
that the university students tested in the control group may
have had a slightly higher average IQ, or that ASD participants
may have scored higher in performance IQ measures than
controls due to compensatory mechanisms relating to stronger
visuo-spatial abilities. Although these issues were outside the
scope of our initial investigation of whether there is any
evidence of perceptual averaging in ASD, they do provide
strong motivation for future research using similar paradigms
to quantify any systematic differences related to perceptual
averaging that may be manifest in larger samples of ASD and
control participants, perhaps by testing participants from the
general public and correlating their performance on standardized
measures of ASD with their performance in tasks such as the
present mean/member and adaptation tasks (e.g., Lowe et al.,
2016).
Even though the present experiments were not designed to
address potential differences in the perceptual averaging abilities
of ASD and neurotypical observers, several aspects of our results
support the merit of such further investigations with a much
larger sample size. Whereas perceptual averaging effects were
present for almost all participants in the present investigation,
in Experiment 1, the relative effect of mean/member task
on ASD participants’ accuracy was about of half the size
of the corresponding effect on control participants’ accuracy
(15%), and ASD observers did not show evidence of typical
patterns of mean size overestimation exhibited by control
participants. Although these results are not entirely inconsistent
with predictions from the WCC Theory (Frith, 1989) that
ASD observers will show decreased reliance on perceptual
averaging and more precise local representations due to weak
(but not absent) central coherence and hypersensitivity to
local detail, these results also raise the interesting possibility
that individuals with ASD may actually be more accurate at
encoding mean versus individual size. Along these lines, both
groups performed poorly in the member task in Experiment
1. Based on previous studies showing superior performance in
ASD versus control observers on tasks involving local details
(Shah and Frith, 1983, 1993; Happé, 1994, 1999; Ehlers et al.,
1997; Jolliffe and Baron-Cohen, 1997; Plaisted et al., 1998;
O’Riordan et al., 2001), we might have expected above chance
performance in the member task for the ASD group. Of course
it is possible that with a smaller set size some differences
may have emerged, and/or that the member task was too
difficult/computationally demanding to allow for an effective
assessment of the precision of individual size representations,
even though only four different sizes were ever presented
within a given set. It is also important to point out that
higher accuracy in the mean task cannot be taken as evidence
that the mean was represented more precisely than could
be expected by averaging the representations of individual
member sizes. In any case, these findings point to the need
for future studies measuring the precision of individual and
average representations in advancing our understanding of visual
perception in ASD.
In Experiment 2, the magnitude of mean size adaptation
was similar for ASD (19.3%, η2 = 0.599) and controls
(20.67%, η2 = 0.616), contrary to previous reports of weaker
adaptation to individual facial identity (Pellicano et al., 2007)
and numerosity (Turi et al., 2015) in ASD. Although null results
of statistical comparisons between the groups of 12 ASD and
12 control participants in the present investigation could not
be meaningfully interpreted, these comparable magnitudes of
mean size adaptation suggest that significant between-group
differences such as those recently reported by Turi et al. (2015)
for numerosity adaptation with groups of 16 ASD and 18 control
participants are not likely to emerge for mean size adaptation
with larger groups of participants. In light of our present
findings of mean size adaptation in ASD, a particularly interesting
avenue of future research involves examining whether perceptual
averaging in ASD also extends to socially meaningful stimuli such
as faces.
Finally, previous studies have measured susceptibility to the
Ebbinghaus illusion in ASD observers using both verbal reports
(Happé, 1996; Hoy et al., 2004) and manual estimations (Ropar
and Mitchell, 1999, 2001). There is still a controversy regarding
whether and how size-contrast effects such as the Ebbinghaus
illusion are manifest in neurotypical perception and action. On
the one hand, numerous studies report size-contrast effects on
perception but not action (e.g., Aglioti et al., 1995; Haffenden
and Goodale, 1998; Marotta et al., 1998; Haffenden et al., 2001).
On the other hand, there are numerous other studies that do
not provide evidence for such dissociation with similar size-
contrast effects across perception and action tasks (e.g., Pavani
et al., 1999; Van Donkelaar, 1999; Franz et al., 2000; Glover
and Dixon, 2001; Kopiske et al., 2016). Along these lines,
Corbett and Song (2014) demonstrated that visually guided
actions directed to test circles presented in regions adapted to
large/small mean sized displays were initially biased in-line with
a persistent perceptual aftereffect. Theories such as the “dorsal
stream vulnerability” hypothesis propose that impairments in
dorsal mechanisms responsible for visually guided actions and
the encoding of contour and global motion (Spencer et al., 2000;
Braddick et al., 2003; Atkinson and Braddick, 2005), and/or low-
level impairments in magnocellular visual processing (e.g., Milne
et al., 2002) are involved in purported autistic global processing
deficits (but see Dakin and Frith, 2005). Therefore, it would be
interesting in future research to examine whether ASD observers’
visually guided actions to stimuli presented in regions adapted to
large/small mean sizes are also biased in-line with the perceptual
aftereffect.
Overall, the persistence of perceptual averaging in this special
population underscores both the fundamental nature of statistical
representations in vision, and the need for future research
to advance our limited understandings of the mechanisms
involved in statistical representations and in differences found
in perception for ASD. The most important implication of
the present findings is that at least some forms of global
statistical processing are automatic and intact in a group of
high-functioning ASD participants. Starting with the idea that
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 12 November 2016 | Volume 7 | Article 1735
fpsyg-07-01735 November 3, 2016 Time: 17:28 # 13
Corbett et al. Autism and Perceptual Averaging
the “gist” of the scene is represented automatically in both
neurotypical and autistic persons, there is more room for
training individuals with ASD to more effectively use their intact
representations of global information than if such visual statistics
were not encoded.
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